Summary of the Good Friday Agreement

The result of these referendums was a large majority in both parts of Ireland in favour of the agreement. In the republic, 56% of voters voted, with 94% of the vote in favour of the constitutional amendment. Turnout in Northern Ireland was 81%, with 71% in favour of the deal. After marathon negotiations, an agreement was finally reached on 10 April 1998. The Good Friday Agreement was a complex balancing act that reflected the three-pronged approach. In Northern Ireland, he created a new devolved assembly for Northern Ireland, with the requirement that executive power be shared by the parties representing both communities. In addition, a new North-South Council of Ministers should be set up to institutionalise the link between the two parts of Ireland. The Irish Government also undertook to amend Articles 2 and 3 of the Republic`s Constitution, which claimed Northern Ireland, to reflect instead the pursuit of Irish unity by purely democratic means while recognising the diversity of identities and traditions in Ireland. Finally, an Island Council should be created recognising the ”totality of relations” within the British Isles, including representatives of both governments and decentralised institutions in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland`s restored leadership faces difficult challenges in providing basic services and tackling sectarian divisions.

One of the most urgent tasks is to improve health services, which fell into crisis after the collapse of local government and have been further burdened by the COVID-19 pandemic. Nurses and other health workers went on strike in December 2019 to protest lower wages than the rest of the UK. Although many health unions have reached agreements with the government on higher wages and other demands in 2020, unions still claim that the system is on an unsustainable path. A similar analysis applies to the assessment of the role of the formal and informal process in the final realization of the agreement. At its core, the most important feature of the process was the emphasis on inclusiveness,100 in particular the controversial decision to involve the parties associated with the paramilitaries before they clearly and manifestly renounce violence, rather than trying to reach an agreement involving only the ”constitutional” parties. From the early days of the riots until the early 1990s, the British and Irish governments had taken a different approach, trying to marginalize the paramilitaries and limit negotiations to constitutional parties. [101] By almost all estimates, the mere presence in the negotiations of people with strong ”arms” ties – McGuinness (Sinn Fein/IRA), Ervine (Progressive Unionist Party) and Gary McMichael (Ulster Democratic Party) – who caused so much heartburn among more traditional political leaders – proved essential to reaching a deal that would last. Therefore, Major`s reluctant decision to find a way to start inclusive conversations after the Mitchell report proved crucial.

Both views were recognized as legitimate. For the first time, the Irish government has agreed in a binding international agreement that Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom. [9] The Irish Constitution has also been amended to implicitly recognise Northern Ireland as part of the territory of the United Kingdom,[7] subject to the consent of the majority of the population of the island`s two jurisdictions to a united Ireland. On the other hand, the wording of the agreement reflects a change in the legal orientation of the United Kingdom from one for the Union to one for a united Ireland. [9] The agreement therefore left open the question of future sovereignty over Northern Ireland. [10] The discussions were divided into three parts: the first, led by the United Kingdom, focused on governance issues for Northern Ireland. The second part dealt with relations between Northern Ireland and the Republic and was led by Mitchell and Harri Holkeri, a former Finnish Prime Minister.67 The third dealt with the Irish-British. It was chaired by the governments of both countries. Decisions were taken on the basis of ”sufficient consensus”. For tracks two and three, this required a majority of each camp (unionist and nationalist) separately, plus a total majority of all delegates, as well as the approval of both governments. Strand One had similar demands, except that the Irish government had no vote.68 This agreement meant that the UUP and SDLP could, at least in theory, strike a deal without Sinn Fein or the DUP.

Blair and Adams met after Sinn Fein entered the talks, the first time in 76 years that a Sinn Fein leader had met with a British prime minister.69 One of the main obstacles to Sinn Fein`s involvement in the peace process was the nature of its ties to the IRA, the paramilitary organisation responsible for most of the attacks on British and Ulster security forces and loyalist paramilitaries. as well as a series of high-profile attacks in England, including a failed assassination attempt on Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, in which one of his advisers was killed. .