I would ask the House to remember what happened. In response, the prime minister said he attached as much importance to Spain as the right-wing honorary lord, but that his methods would likely lead to better progress and that ”the new atmosphere” would have ”a good effect.” He went on to tell us, with a triumph that the House will remember, that Signor Mussolini had accepted the British formula for the evacuation of foreign troops that morning. We assumed, of course, that there would be no difficulty in drawing up a plan to carry out this operation. The Prime Minister then made concrete commitments, which I would like to quote. He said he had told Signor Grandi that the government considered a solution to the Spanish question ”as an essential feature of any agreement we could reach.” He said at the time that this was an ”essential feature” of the agreement, not a ”condition for its completion.” He then said that if we went to Geneva, it would be important for no one to be able to say that ”the situation in Spain has been considerably changed by Italy during the talks, either by sending new reinforcements to General Franco or by not implementing the agreements provided for by the British formula”. Let the Assembly — ”during the talks” — that is, from 21 February to today — take note of this. I would like to draw particular attention to two points arising from this agreement. 280 What is the British foreign policy behind it and what impact does it have on British security? I don`t want to investigate this busy road from Manchuria to Prague via Abyssinia, Austria, Spain and Czechoslovakia. It`s an itinerary littered with bodies of British foreign ministers and the remnants of agreements and commitments we tore apart during the trip. If you want to interpret all these incidents and the current Anglo-Italian agreement to find out what underlies British foreign policy, then you have to find the highest common factor – perhaps I should have said the lowest common factor – of all these incidents.
In each of these cases, you will find that a free and independent country has come into conflict with the totalitarians. The forms and sometimes more than the forms of democratic government were observed in each of these countries – although this may not be true of Ethiopia, the emperor of Ethiopia was nevertheless endowed with principles and a good man who did the best for his country. In each of these countries, with the exception of Abyssinia and Austria, Russia has had an influence on their own. Even in the cases of Abyssinia and Austria, Russia, as a member of the League, had an influence on their side. Because of the particular responsibility of that country with regard to the policy of non-interference, it seemed essential to me that, before starting negotiations with another Mediterranean power, particularly interested in the Spanish problem, on a new agreement, we should ensure that we both speak the same language, that we both hear the same thing, by adhering to a policy of non-interference. Long before these talks opened in Rome, it was clear that this was not the case. We wanted to say and still want to say – this country means – with non-interference and leave it to the Spaniards to sort out their own destiny. Other powers, however, have made it clear through their actions that they do not intend to let the signing of the non-interference agreement stand in the way of military action they deem necessary to ensure the victory of the party they represent. In other words, we and the Italian Government were talking about Spain in completely different languages. I thought it was essential to clarify this situation, otherwise the Italian intervention in Spain would take place in parallel with our negotiations. It seemed like an unbearable situation to me.
I did not see how it could be possible to conclude an agreement with another power, when the armed forces of 233 of that power, contrary to the explicit commitment they had signed, were intervening in a civil war in a friendly state, and while their planes were bombing cities of that state and sinking ships engaged in a trade to which they themselves had expressly consented, to be completely legitimate. 211 Perhaps the Assembly wishes to know that, when the French Government was informed of our intention to follow this path, not only did it raise no objections, but it also stated that it generally welcomed anything that could contribute to the improvement of Anglo-Italian relations. Perhaps it is not necessary to tell the House that, in keeping with what has now become the usual routine, the dominions have been kept informed of all our intentions, and I am very pleased to be able to read in the House a message that I received from the Prime Minister of Australia, which reads as follows: the Commonwealth Government is convinced that: that the Anglo-Italian Agreement be put into effect immediately as a contribution to peace and the de jure recognition of the Italian conquest of Abyssinia. The withdrawal of 10,000 Italian troops from Spain seems to be a real contribution. In our view, a peaceful and friendly Mediterranean is essential for the current state of the world. Refusing de jure recognition seems to us to ignore the facts and risk danger to an issue that is no longer relevant. I have also received the following message from the Prime Minister of South Africa: General Hertzog has taken note of the contents of this telegram” – this is the telegram informing him of our intention to bring into force the Anglo-Italian Agreement – with great satisfaction, and he considers that the measures proposed by His Majesty`s Government in the United Kingdom are wise and necessary and will contribute significantly to appeasement in Europe. We will see how the Prime Ministers of Australia and South Africa have addressed in these two messages what I believe is at the root of the issue and have recognized that in the actions that Her Majesty`s Government intends to take, they are not just about the relationship between us and Italy. however, the step we are taking must be seen as a step in the policy that I have described in the House many times. 562 He described the details of the Treaty and its annexes as mere trifles. The details of the agreement are not the agreement itself. The essence of the agreement is the restoration of an old friendship based on history and the natural needs and conditions of the two countries concerned.
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